

24

E

U

PR

U

The
F
C

B

L

3

Q

246

N^o 10

THE FREEBORN
ENGLISHMAN's
Unmasked Battery:
CONTAINING
REMARKS
ON THE
PRELIMINARY ARTICLES
OF
PEACE,
GROUNDED UPON
UNDENIABLE FACTS,


SHEWING
The fatal Tendency of granting the *French* a
FISHERY, and restoring our most important
Conquests.

O my Country!

L O N D O N:
Printed for P. HUNT, in Ludgate-Street.

M.DCC.LXII.

Bibliothèque,
Le Séminaire de Québec,
3, rue de l'Université,
Québec 4, QUE.



THE THIRTEEN
ENGLISHMAN'S
Unmasked Battery:

CONTAINING
THE ENGLISHMAN'S
ON THE
PRELIMINARY ARTICLES

OF
THE ENGLISHMAN'S
GROUND FROM
UNIDENTIFIED FACTS

The following is a summary of the facts
which are stated in the above

C
of t
expo
seve
arti
for
illik
the
flig
ter
na
to

fo
no
an
th

U

B

them at that time not only excited general disgust but *horror*: they were universally considered as insecure, inglorious, and no way adequate to our extraordinary successes; and therefore not credited (though feared by the discerning to be but too true) because it was hoped, or rather people persuaded themselves to believe, peace would not be bought on such sacrificing conditions: but time has now discovered how *fond* we have been to *purchase* a peace; what *generous* cessions we have made, with hearts overflowing with kindness, even to our natural and sworn eternal enemies, that a stranger may be tempted to believe we were desirous of peace on *any* conditions; “any sort of a peace rather than none.”

About

About
naries
and a
two *lin*
deserv
served
forrow
nify,
shoul
to car
vanqu
like a
try, sh
lity tal
bassad
Thus
to op
gociat
to fig
store
my;
millio

About the time that the preliminaries first began to be handed about, and appear in the public papers, two *little* incidents happened, which deserve public notice. It was observed with marks of regret, with sorrow for national honour and dignity, that the conquering power should equip one of the royal yachts to carry over an ambassador to the vanquished; and having landed him like a hostage in the enemy's country, should afterwards, with all *humility* take on board, the enemy's ambassador, and *bring* him to England. Thus we became the first *drudges* to openly set on foot a pacific negotiation; the carriers and fetchers to sign away our conquests; to restore power to the bankrupt enemy; to return what has cost us millions of money and thousands of

lives : generous Britons ! The other *little* incident is of a mysterious nature. It is true indeed it occasioned *some* alarm, and mankind were astonished, but they could not account for the cause ; and it is still a political mystery. A powerful squadron was equipped, at a considerable expence ; the command was given to admiral Hawke, and he sailed, as the public *expected*, to intercept several very rich Spanish and French ships, then supposed to be on their return home ; but soon after he arrived on his station, he was ordered to bring his squadron back to England. In vain did the public search for a cause of this their sudden disappointment ; it reminded them of admiral Haddick, who 1736 had his hands tied up. But now *Gray* of more than
 proba-

probability seems to inform us, that his unexpected return must be attributed to our *earnest* desire of *obtaining* a peace : is it therefore unlikely, that it might be stipulated in some *secret* preliminary ? It is confessed, with the greatest deference to our superiors that these *little* incidents are but *trifles*, and that they *might* be passed over, in order to accomplish so desirable an end as peace : but

Trifles, light as air,
Are to the jealous *indications*
strong,
As proofs from holy writ :

and it is the old observation of those *philosophers* who have studied mankind, that the real disposition of men is often times more clearly discovered by some *trifling* circumstance,

stance, than by one more important.

This is a disagreeable theme, and we will therefore quit it: we are sorry we have been so unlucky as to hit upon it; but the reader will pardon our errors, as our *fallibility* is at least in existence, tho' not *equal* to that for which our superiors are more *distinguished*.

The preliminaries naturally fall under our consideration; they have been published by authority; and who can forbear reading them? who can forbear examining them, and offering his opinion in an affair where every one is so materially interested? This is a privilege which Englishmen *yet* enjoy. It is a privilege which every man ought to hold dear to his breast as the sacred remnant of inestimable freedom.

Conscious

Conscious of this constitutional right, where is that abject and cowardly slave that is afraid to condemn these preliminaries, if it shall be found that they are inglorious, insecure, and the seeds of a future war left in them? That this may not be the case all good Englishmen heartily wish; but that it is but too probable all men of discernment have too much reason to fear. They see great sacrifices made; fresh power, and consequently new swords put into the enemies hands, as well as much room for future cavil and dispute. Dangers like these are alarming; and the candid and impartial, who would if possible think well, are now in spite of themselves, in spite of every sentiment of cordiality, obliged to yield to irrefragable conviction.

It

It were to be wished, that the first preliminary article had been the fulfilling of those articles of former treaties, which have not been complied with; and that until this stipulation was fully and exactly performed, no other preliminary article had been agreed to. The necessity and advantage of such an article is apparent. Our right of cutting logwood would have been primarily secured; our possession of Nova Scotia affixed; the island of St. Lucia our own, &c. since we have, and can prove, a right to these places from former treaties; and consequently the fair fulfilling of those treaties which gave us this right ought to have been first insisted upon. Then, indeed, if from motives of generosity, we had chose to restore any of those places which
our

our
woul
surely
ry ar
is the
T
form
tance
“
maje
whic
migh
or A
rant
depe
Brit
tians
to h
right
den
Cap
the
Lau

our arms have conquered, there would have been less indignity: but surely to admit into the preliminary articles, what was before our own, is the highest insult.

The first article is an article of form, and therefore of no importance.

“ Art. II. His most christian majesty renounces all pretensions, which he has heretofore formed, or might have formed, to Nova Scotia, or Acadia, in all its parts, and guaranties the whole of it, with all its dependencies, to the King of Great Britain: moreover, his most christian majesty cedes, and guaranties to his said Britannic majesty, in full right, Canada, with all its dependencies, as well as the island of Cape Breton, and all the islands in the Gulph, and river of St. Laurence, without restriction, and

without any liberty to depart from this cession and guaranty, under any pretence, or to trouble Great Britain in the possessions abovementioned. His Britannic majesty, on his side, agrees to grant to the inhabitants of Canada the liberty of the Catholic religion: he will, in consequence, give the most exact and the most effectual orders, that his new Roman Catholic subjects may profess the worship of their religion, according to the rites of the Roman church, as far as the laws of Great Britain permit. His Britannic majesty further agrees, that the French inhabitants, or others who would have been subjects of the most christian king in Canada, may retire, in all safety and freedom, wherever they please, and may sell their estates, provided it be to his Britannic majesty's subjects,

jects, and transport their effects, as well as their persons, without being restrained in their emigration, under any pretence whatsoever, except debts or criminal prosecutions: the term limited for this emigration being fixed to the space of eighteen months, and to be computed from the day of the ratification of the definitive treaty.

Nova Scotia was our own before. It is true the peace of Aix la Chapelle left it to a future discussion; but that discussion should have been decided before the present preliminaries had been agreed to, which might soon and easily have been effected in the present humbled condition of the French. The memorials drawn up by the Hon. Charles Townshend, in so clear, masterly, and correct a manner, presented at Paris in 1752 by

William Shirley and William Mildmeyer, esqrs. sufficiently evince our undoubted and unanswerable right to it. They have not left room for the smallest cavil of the most shuffling French negociator. The retention of Cape Breton is not unexpected, because in its present dismantled state the French do not hold it in any estimation; and they have other places, which they make equally as valuable. Canada is the most important conquest we retain by this peace; but it is a country too sharp for Englishmen to live in; it is inaccessible half the year, and many parts of it quite barren; and, taking ten years together, it does not produce provisions enough for its own inhabitants. Its commodities were never sufficient to pay for the woollen and other manufactures it received from France. However,

it

it gives peace to all our northern settlements, and secures to us the friendship and alliance of those Indian tribes contiguous to it, and furnishes us with furs; an article which is capable of great improvement and much advantage to this nation; did not French policy artfully check it, by a new-fashioned introduction of feathered muffs; which our ladies for want of knowledge, and our gentlemen for want of consideration, suffer to steal insensibly upon them; before they are aware of the mischiefs it may do this colony, or the stab that is thus secretly given to our interests. The suffrage of the roman catholic religion in this, or any other country, as far as the laws of Great-Britain permit, is absurd; because the laws of Great Britain permit no such thing. It is true, indeed, our laws allow

allow a liberty of conscience ; but a toleration of the roman catholic faith is no where asserted : there are even many laws to the contrary.

“ Art. III. The subjects of France shall have the liberty of fishing and drying, on a part of the coasts of the island of Newfoundland, such as it is specified in the 13th article of the treaty of Utrecht, which article shall be confirmed and renewed by the approaching definitive treaty (except what regards the island of Cape Breton, as well as the other islands in the mouth and in the gulph of St. Laurence : And his Britannic majesty consents to leave to the most christian king's subjects the liberty to fish in the gulph of St. Laurence, on condition that the subjects of France do not exercise the said fishery, but at the distance of three leagues from all the coasts belonging

belonging to Great Britain, as well those on the continent, as those of the islands situated in the said gulph of St. Laurence. And as to what relates to the fishery out of the said gulph, his most christian majesty's subjects shall not exercise the fishery, but at the distance of fifteen leagues from the coasts of the island of Cape Breton."

A fishery in the gulph of St. Laurence is the most dangerous branch of it all; because the French will trade with their old friends the roman catholics of Canada, will furnish them with French manufactures, and take away our peltry; thus reaping the profits of the province, and leaving us the expence of supporting it. As for the stipulation that they are not to come within three leagues of our coasts, it is vague and uncertain, and will
be

be ever productive of disputes and dissension ; for how can the limits of the sea be affixed ? Are we, besides being at the expence of keeping a military force in Canada to keep a squadron on its coasts, and in the gulph of St. Laurence, to watch and prevent the French fishing beyond their due bounds ? Is not here a door for constant cause of complaint ? and will not the French here find pretences for a new war whenever they are prepared for it ? But this is not the only cession made by us ; for the right which the French had by the peace of Utrecht is confirmed, of fishing and drying their fish on the coasts of Newfoundland. The 13th article of the treaty of Utrecht is in these words.

“ The island called Newfoundland, with the adjacent islands, shall
from

from this time forward belong of right wholly to Britain; and to that end the town and fortress of Placentia, and whatever other places in the said island in possession of the French, shall be yielded and given up, within seven months from the exchange of the ratification of this treaty, or sooner if possible, by the most christian king, to those who have a commission from the queen of Great Britain for that purpose. Nor shall the most christian king, his heirs and successors, or any of their subjects at any time hereafter, lay claim to any right to the said island and islands, or to any part of it or them. Moreover it shall not be lawful for the subjects of France, to fortify any place in the said island of Newfoundland, or to erect any buildings there besides stages made of boards, and huts

D

necessary

necessary and usual for drying of fish, or to resort to the said island beyond the time necessary for fishing and drying of fish. But it shall be allowed to the subjects of France to catch fish, and to dry them on land in that part only, and in no other besides that, of the said island of Newfoundland, which stretches from the place called Cape Bonavista to the northern point of the said island, and from thence running down by the western side, reaches as far as the place called Point Riche."—How careful are the French of renewing and establishing their claims according to former treaties!

“ Art. IV. The king of Great Britain cedes the islands of St. Peter, and of Miquelon, in full right, to his most christian majesty, to serve as a shelter for the French fishermen ;

men ; and his said majesty obliges himself, on his royal word, not to fortify the said islands ; to erect no buildings there but merely for the conveniency of the fishery ; and to keep there only a guard of fifty men for the police."

The vast consequence of this fishery should have prevented our ministry from ceding any port to France in these parts. It is very plain from the situation of these islands, and the part of the coast of Newfoundland which is for their use, that they will raise as great a fishery as ever the possession of Louisbourg gave them ; for the reader is greatly mistaken, if he imagines that that town assisted their fishing in any other respect, than as a port for their ships to rendezvous at. St. Peter's is as well situated as Cape Breton, and they

doubtless, will make it as great nursery as the other. The value of their cod fishery (for which the island of St. Peter's is finely situated) before we drove them quite out of it, was immense. It was unbounded, and inestimable, annually employing at least a thousand sail, from two hundred to four hundred tons, and twenty thousand men. In the year 1730 there was a computation made of two hundred and twenty thousand quintals of fish at Marseilles only, for a market, and *communibus annis* they cured above five millions of quintals. What a dangerous nursery of seamen the fishery has been, and ever will be, while in their possession is very obvious, and yet this was only a share; much greater indeed than ours. But these are not all the evils we have to dread. The French will

will do
these ill
a mag
the wi
factures
may be
produced
colonies
islands
as all th
France
French
or fore
trade
prejud
the ce
to us
thoug
mised
these
his w
know
is to

will doubtless make one or both these islands another Monte Christi, a magazine or storehouse, where the wines and brandy, the manufactures and merchandizes of France, may be safely exchanged for all such products of Canada and the British colonies, as France or her sugar islands may have occasion for : and as all the returns from these islands to France and her West Indies will be in French ships, it is not easy to estimate or foresee the great advantage to the trade and navigation of France, and prejudice to those of Great Britain, the cession of these now barren and to us useless islands may be. Although the French king has promised on his royal word not to fortify these islands, yet we have only *his word* for it ; and all the world knows how much a French *promise* is to be depended on. As to the
number

number of men, was it to be confined to twenty by the treaty, and the French honour should be so delicate as not for some time to exceed that number; yet how easily may 2000 men be transported thither a few months before they resolve to recommence hostilities. We have seen by the works lately destroyed by us at Cherburg, that the French can make a good and strong harbour upon almost any coast, and every one may foresee more than another Cape Breton in these islands, as their harbours will never be shut up by frosts in winter, and are situated so near the British colonies. We may remember what desperate efforts the French made, before the breaking out of this war, to get an harbour in the bay of Fundy, or any way in the north American Ocean, that should be open

open a
so ma
their
subje
prefe
to En
for
our
new
Euro
Indi
proc
cha
stea
viga
to l
mo
for
of
un
fei
wi
at

open all the year ; and must we, after so many glorious victories, gratify their fondest wishes ? Their old subjects the Canadians will certainly prefer the wine and brandy of France to English malt spirits in exchange for their furs and skins, as well as our own colonies will flock to this new-erected cheap market for all European as well as West and East Indian goods, as far as their natural products will enable them to purchase or exchange ; and thus, instead of extending our trade and navigation, we may perhaps be found to have parted with the largest and most valuable of what we had before : neither would the whole fleet of England be able to prevent it, unless they be allowed to enter and seize the British smuggling vessels with their crews and cargoes ; which at best would tend to disgust and alienate

alienate the affections of our colonies from their mother-country. This French situation in the very midst of the British fishery must also furnish infinite occasions of dispute and quarrel, and perhaps of future war ; the preventing of which is said to have been a principal reason for preferring poor and barren Canada to rich and fertile Guadaloupe.

“ Art. V. The town and port of Dunkirk shall be put into the state fixed by the last treaty of Aix la Chapelle, and by former treaties : the cunette shall remain as it now is, provided that the English engineers, named by his Britannic majesty, and received at Dunkirk by order of his most christian majesty, verify, that this cunette is only of use for the wholesomeness of the air, and the health of the inhabitants.”

This

This is an inconsiderable article, of very little importance, and can only feed French vanity with hopes of duping us with terrors of future invasions ; for when they are ready to break with us, they will soon fortify Dunkirk, if it is of any advantage to them : but that it is not, is pretty evident from the present war, when they have been reduced to every shift, and consequently would have had recourse to it if they could have found any benefit in it. But the French have *complaisantly* allowed to put this place in the same state as fixed by former treaties, in consequence of their having a very valuable branch of the fishery.

Will common sense allow, that the demolition of Dunkirk is equal to such a share of the fishery ? It may perhaps be said, that Dunkirk

E

is

This

is an object of real fear in the English, but 'tis no such thing; formerly it was feared, but never with any real grounds, and the demand originally to demolish it was unjust and absurd; we have just as much right to make the demolition of Brest an article in a peace, as we had to expect that of Dunkirk at first. But if this place was of such great consequence as some very obstinately insist it is, sure it can never be allowed of so much importance, as even the tenth part of the Newfoundland fishery; France contains many Dunkirks, but she possesses only one fishery. If we examine any list of the prizes made during the course of the present war by the French, we shall not find that a large proportion of them was carried into Dunkirk; many other ports of
France

France have been more fatal to our trade, and particularly Bayonne: why don't we demand that the harbour of this nest of privateers be demolished? This absurd conduct is founded merely on the French principle "the law of convenience." As to invasions, we have little or no reason to fear Dunkirk, (nor indeed all the ports of France) on that account, for all the expence that ever was or ever can be laid out upon it, will never make it capable of being a first rate harbour; and if it could admit very large ships of war, its situation renders it very improper for an invasion, for no port can be fit for that, unless it is very near the part of the enemies coast they would invade. Now from Dunkirk a fleet must sail a considerable way before it can land troops with safety: all

our Kentish and southern coasts quite to Portsmouth are so deep and impenetrable, that an enemy could not even land; or if they were landed, make any progress. For these reasons the French will never fit out an expedition fleet from this port, but only make a great parade of naval preparations at it, to frighten the English: if it was really formidable to the greatest degree, if its harbour was as extensive and deep as those of Brest or Toulon, yet we should have no more reason to be afraid of it than of those towns; much less to give such an immense consideration for its demolition. The French, by means of the possession of the islands of St. Peter's and Miquelon, and the confirmation of part of the thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, will soon revive their fishery, and raise it to

as

as gr
acce
them
more
Dun
fear
thou
Fren
they
than
to r
pre
we
acce
tha
don
rop
for
nav
pre
we
occ
ign

as great a height as ever : such an accession of wealth will soon enable them to render many of their ports more truly formidable to us than Dunkirk. Sure we ought more to fear a nursery of twenty or thirty thousand seamen, than a paltry French port! By the cod-fishery they will be enabled, more perhaps than by any other branch of trade, to revive their navy; and every unprejudiced person will allow, that we have far greater reason to fear an accession of naval power to France, than any single port in that kingdom. All the fortifications in Europe cannot make a French port formidable: trade alone can raise a navy; and if we had taken care to prevent them from raising a trade, we should never have had the least occasion to fear French ports. The ignorant may fancy, that as long as
Louisbourg

Louisbourg is demolished, and Cape Breton is ours, we have no reason to fear the power of France in those seas. But nothing can be more absurd; it was not Louisbourg that was of such bad consequence to us, but the flourishing state of the French fishery, which depended merely on places to dry their fish on, and erect warehouses. The fortifications had nothing to do with the fishery, and the want of them could never have prevented its increase; we give them islands for their necessary purposes as well situated as Cape Breton, and much nearer the great herring bank. Can Dunkirk be reckoned an equivalent for a share of this trade? And a share unlimited; for the French may, if they please, employ ten thousand sail in it. In short, no peace should have been thought of, that left the French at liberty to employ

employ a single ship in this trade, for a treaty could not contain an article of greater importance. If we were to keep the whole of this fishery in our own hands, we should gain annually two millions of pounds sterling, by the lowest computations; for it occasions a consumption of manufactures greater than what at first can be conceived. It would not only be depriving our enemies of so important a branch of their trade, but would abridge the revenue of France, by lessening the consumption of French salt, the profit of which is solely in the crown, and more than half of which that was made in the kingdom was employed in this fishery. At the same time the revenue from our own salt trade, which stands engaged for a considerable part of the national debt, would increase in proportion

proportion as that of France lessened. Were we possessed of this fishery alone, it might be an eternal nursery of thirty, forty, or perhaps fifty thousand seamen, since nobody can tell the improvements which would result from the sole possession. And had we not a right to expect it from our extraordinary success in the war? Were we not in a condition to impose our own terms?

“ Art. VI. In order to re-establish peace on the most solid and lasting foundations, and to remove for ever every subject of dispute with regard to the limits of the British and French territories on the continent of America; it is agreed, that, for the future, the confines between the dominions of his Britannic majesty, and those of his most christian majesty, in that part
of

of the
fixed
Mississippi
the river
by a
of the
repas
and t
tian
guar
the
ever
oug
fide
the
isla
sha
tha
fis
to
th
an
fe

of the world, shall be irrevocably fixed by a line drawn along the Mississippi, from its source, as far as the river Iberville, and from thence, by a line drawn along the middle of this river, and of the lakes Maurepas and Pontarchain, to the sea; and to this purpose, the most christian king cedes in full right, and guaranties to his Britannic majesty, the river and port of Mobile, and every thing that he possesses, or ought to have possessed, on the left side of the river Mississippi, except the town of New Orleans, and the island in which it is situated, which shall remain to France; provided that the navigation of the river Mississippi shall be equally free, as well to the subjects of Great Britain as to those of France, in its whole breadth and length, from its source to the sea; and that part expressly, which

is between the said island of New Orleans, and the right bank of that river, as well as the passage both in and out of its mouth: it is further stipulated, that the vessels belonging to the subjects of either nation shall not be stopped, visited, or subjected to the payment of any duty whatsoever. The stipulations in favour of the inhabitants of Canada, inserted in the second article, shall also take place, with regard to the inhabitants of the countries ceded by this article."

The permitting the French to continue in possession of New Orleans can never re-establish peace on a solid and lasting foundation. We might as well have given them Crown Point. The latter was never a greater thorn in the side of New England, than the former will be in Georgia. It will render what little
 advantage

advantage
 rived from
 no effect
 ing new
 ments,
 subjects
 word, i
 be lodg
 inevitab
 beginni
 this pl
 tinually
 will be
 Indian
 lion ag
 underf
 phers,
 alread
 Louisi
 town
 Mobil
 and b
 to hav

advantage may be *hoped* to be derived from the cession of Florida of no effect, and be the cause of spreading new terrors on the back settlements, as well as excite the Spanish subjects to acts of hostility. In a word, it is permitting a dagger to be lodged in our bosom, which will inevitably stab us to the heart in the beginning of a future war. From this place the French will be continually making excursions; they will be ever tampering with the Indians, and stirring them to rebellion against us. It has been ever understood by all our best geographers, that the river Mississippi was already the western boundary of Louisiana; consequently then the town of New Orleans, as well as Mobile, were illegal encroachments, and being considered as such, ought to have been evacuated accordingly:

at least this satisfaction and security was reasonably expected by the public; though the same reason which is given for the retention of Canada, is equally strong for demanding Louisiana, and the nation has long most ardently wished this acquisition had been made, as it is certain the security of our colonies will never be made permanent till the French are totally extirpated from north America.

“ Art. VII. The king of Great Britain shall restore to France the islands of Guadalupe, of Marigalante, of Desirade, of Martinico, and of Belleisle; and the fortresses of these islands shall be restored in the same condition they were in when they were conquered by the British arms; provided that the term of eighteen months, computed from the day of the ratification of the

the definitive treaty, shall be granted to his Britannic majesty's subjects, who may have settled in the said islands, and other places restored to France by the definitive treaty, to sell their estates, recover their debts, and transport their effects, as well as their persons, without being restrained on account of their religion, or under any other pretence whatsoever, except that of debts, or of criminal prosecutions."

England, as a commercial nation, will ever consider this as the most important article in the whole treaty. Posterity will read with astonishment this account of our unbounded generosity. *What* (they will say) *could not our ancestors keep one of those islands?* --- Yes, replies HONESTY, they might have kept them all; but, like Charles the XIIth, they had such a spirit of taking

taking and giving away, that they rendered their enemies more formidable than themselves. Thus is poor England left with a load of debt upon her shoulders, and deprived of her most valuable acquisitions, that would have greatly contributed towards easing her load.

Guadalupe is extremely fruitful, and being not more than half cultivated, is capable of very great improvement. The great wealth of it at the time we took it was unknown. It produces more sugar than any of our islands, except Jamaica, by which branch of trade alone 300,000*l. per ann.* might be cleared by our merchants. For having sufficient from our own islands to supply our home consumption, the whole produce of Guadalupe might be exported, and would consequently be so much clear

clear money to England : on a very moderate computation, not less than 400 ships have annually sailed from this island, by which it is a nursery for at least 5000 seamen. Besides the value of its great exports, there is a trade carried on from thence to the Carraccas, and other parts of the Spanish main. The slaves on this island are worth upwards of one million two hundred fifty thousand pounds. The sole motive of attacking it, was, the destroying the nest of privateers, which greatly annoyed our trade. Is it not surprising, that we should so soon forget, in what view it was considered when in the hands of the French ? It would have been much better for the nation this conquest had never been made ; for since we have had the possession of it, the planters have been the chief gainers.

gainers. They have sold their sugars and other products so dear, and bought their negroes so cheap, that it is computed they have nearly doubled their fortunes. So that now we are in the situation of a jeweller, who having received a diamond in the rough, returns it beautifully polished, without requiring any consideration. The generous capitulation granted to the inhabitants by general Barington, not only secured that valuable conquest, but gained all their hearts; so that they were extremely disposed to become faithful subjects under so mild a government. As an acquisition, that may be of service in a time of war, Gaudalupe is by no means inconsiderable.

The island of La Desirade being the first land usually made by our ships bounds to the West Indies, they

they are easily perceived in their course from thence by the privateers of Guadalupe, which could not have a more convenient station to annoy us in this particular than that island.

Marigalante is an island as large as Antigua, and produces a great deal of tobacco and coffee.

Martinico makes annually about forty thousand hogheads of white sugar, and ten thousand of brown, prodigious quantities of coffee, cocoa, and a good deal of cotton: it has an excellent harbour, to which all ships repair in the hurricane season. St. Pierre is a very populous, large, and well built town; here it is that the produce of the French Windward Islands centers, and from whence they are all furnished with European goods. This island has ever

G

been

been the terror of Barbadoes, Antigua, St. Kitt's, Nevis, and Montserrat.

The whole French Leeward Island credit with old France was established with Martinico, and Martinico alone ; all their other islands traded with Martinico, and Martinico alone traded with old France.

It is computed that these islands make annually at least one hundred thousand hogshheads of white and brown sugar, the duty of which would be to England, if we kept them, 600,000*l.* a year. Their coffee, cocoa, cotton, and rum, would amount to as much as their sugar ; and it could be easily made appear, that these islands would pay at least one million a year revenue ; and this would pay half the interest of all the money borrowed the whole war, beside the prodigious

prodigious trade it would occasion to the kingdom.

Let it be remembered, that when we restored them, the French had it not in their power to take any thing from us. *Amazing generosity!* We should put ourselves into the place of the French, by calmly asking ourselves, *Was England at the mercy of France at this time, what would France require of England?* Doubtless, a cession of all the means to hurt her favourite views, which center in the extension of her commerce, and the prosperity of her trade. As both nations have the same purposes, what must a French minister, meeting at a table, where he is to give law to England, and tossing down his papers, say, but "Gentlemen, my master expects that you are to abolish your marine; he is tired of having you

to encounter every time you are able to make head against him; he sees no end of it, and therefore, once for all, you are to reduce your shipping to the number of twenty ships of the line, and thirty-five frigates. These are sufficient, while France is your friend, for the protection of your commerce, and the defence of the few colonies you have left.---You must comply, or expect the consequences."

Every man, who knows any thing of History, must be sensible, that the ambition of France, for upwards of a century past, has been to be a commercial and maritime Power. This spirit still dwells upon the minds of her people; and for fifty years past has influenced all her measures; therefore the important point which England ought to have had in view, was crushing the commerce

merce and naval power of France: but unhappily this seems to have been forgot.

Belleisle is of no service to England; therefore its restoration is scarce worth mentioning.

“ Art. VIII. The most Christian king cedes and guaranties to his Britannic majesty, in full right, the islands of Grenada, and the Grenadines, with the same stipulations in favour of the inhabitants of this colony, as are inserted in the II^d article for those of Canada: and the partition of the islands called Neutral is agreed and fixed, so that those of St. Vincent, Dominico, and Tobago shall remain in full right to England, and that of St. Lucia shall be delivered to France, to enjoy the same in like manner in full right: the two crowns reciprocally guarantying

trying to each other the participation so stipulated”.

The Grenades are every way unserviceable. They are at too great a distance from our islands to add any thing to our security; and their climate is exceeding unwholesome; the most dreadful fevers rage there perpetually. They are of no kind of importance; were never of any use; are mean and pitiful; and have therefore been seldom heard of.

As to the Grenadines, “ they are so inconsiderable, that no nation has thought them worth possessing.”

Salmon. Such are the equivalents for restoring the best islands in the West Indies.

The partition of the neutral islands was no doubt dictated by the same wisdom. St. Vincent, Dominico, and Tobago, *which are our*

own

own already, and consequently ought not to have been as objects to be purchased in the treaty of peace. However, these three are altogether worthless. St. Vincent, the largest of them, cannot be planted with security, being inhabited by the most barbarous of all savages (the Caribbees) who can arm eight or ten thousand men at any time; neither fair nor foul means can clear the country of them, as they can occasionally secure themselves from danger in the mountainous parts of the island. As to Tobago, it is scarce worth mentioning, and is still more unhealthy, and is infested with insects to a degree that is absolutely intolerable; the negroes frequently escape to the neighbouring continent, and the savages as often visit it for plunder; so there is no security for the planters; besides, in all these

those islands there are no rivers, which is the case with most other Leeward Islands belonging to the English; and upon that account, as well as their soil being exhausted, they are scarce worth any body's having. Dominico has neither bay nor port to retire to, nor can the ships have any shelter but under it. Where then is the use of this little island? St. Lucia is the only one of importance; but how we can ascertain the giving it away is matter of surprize; for it appears by the memorials delivered at Paris by the English commissaries in 1751, that it was private property. It is there said, that Charles I. made a grant of it in 1627 to the earl of Carlisle; and it appears from the records of the office of the commissioners for trade and plantations, that, in pursuance of this grant, the earl of
 Carlisle

Carlisle took possession of this island, by sending several colonies of English to it in the years 1635, 1638 and 1640 ; yet, from some unaccountable cause, it was one of those places, the fate of which was by the treaty of Aix la Chapelle left to the decision of commissaries ; and, according to the rules of sound policy, the dispute ought to have been adjusted before the admission of any preliminary articles for the future definitive treaty. It grows a great deal of coffee and cocoa, and is more valuable than almost any island in the West Indies, on account of its very excellent harbour, which has all the advantages that can be desired, and of which we stand in great need, because we have only one harbour, which is far inferior (St. John's at

H Antigua)

Antigua) that is capable of being of any real use or advantage to us.

“ Article IX. His Britannic majesty shall restore to France the island of Goree, in the condition it was in when conquered: and his most christian majesty cedes in full right, and guaranties to the king of Great Britain, Senegal.”

Senegal without Goree will be found to be like a coat without sleeves. By this separation of them neither our African trade will reap any advantage, nor will that of the French be lessened. Goree of itself is sufficient for the negro trade: and as for Senegal, if the claim of an exclusive grant to its trade is admitted and gratified, the conquest will no longer be of any use to the public. Will it be presumed, that our ministers detained it only for the purpose of bestowing it on one man,
to

to the exclusion of all the other merchants of this kingdom? Its principal commodity is gum, which every one knows is absolutely necessary in the printing of linnens and other manufactures, of which the home consumption, as well as exportation, is very great: and as the late ministry relieved us from the necessity of buying this article from our neighbours on their own terms; so it is hoped the present will secure it to the public from that worst enemy to trade, a monopoly.

By the 10th article we are more generous in the East-Indies than we are in West, for in the East we restore *all* without any equivalent. The French are to be put in possession of the same territory which they had in 1749, upon condition that they renounce the acquisitions which they *have made* on the coast of Coromandel.

This is very extraordinary: How can the French renounce what they have not? It is well known that they have been extirpated from the whole coast of Coromandel long ago: they do not hold one inch of territory upon it. The consequence of restoring them all they have lost in probability, will be furnishing them with new opportunities for tampering with the nabobs of Arcot, &c. and again exciting them to acts of hostility against us.

“ Art. XI. The island of Minorca shall be restored to his Britannic majesty, as well as fort St. Philip, in the same condition they were in when they were conquered by the arms of the most christian King; and with the artillery that was there at the taking of the said island, and of the said fort.”

Altho’

A
to b
repr
Byng
of th
the
neve
near
prot
as l
the
alter
adv
two
Que
in f
flee
ther
ther
care
arti
He

Altho' Minorca was once thought to be of great consequence, and was represented as such in Admiral Byng's time; yet during the course of the present war we have not felt the loss of it. The enemy's fleets never escaped out of the Mediterranean, and our trade there has been protected just in the same manner as before. If Minorca's being in the hands of the French made any alteration at all, it was rather to our advantage, for the destruction of the two French squadrons under Du Quesne, and De la Clue, has been, in some measure, attributed to our fleet's being obliged to keep the sea, there not being any harbour for them to lie in under the excuses of careening, watering, &c.

The XIIth, XIIIth, and XIVth articles relate to Germany. Hanover, Hesse, Brunswick and Buckebourg, are

are all to be evacuated by the French; Ostend and Nieuport are to be evacuated. Cleves, Wezel, and Gueldres, belonging to the king of Prussia, are likewise to be evacuated. And each party has bound themselves up not to assist their German friends. But an after-declaration of the French minister says, that France is still understood to be left at liberty to pay her debts. Thus may she, under the specious pretence of paying her debts, assist the Empress-Queen or any other German ally for these ten years to come; while we, on the contrary, cannot do our allies the same justice, because there is no loop-hole for us to creep out at. By the XVth article the legality of some prizes made on the Spanish flag before the war with Spain, are to be tried: But no mention is made of the Antigal-

lican,

lican, nor of the number of English vessels which the Spaniards have unlawfully seized, nor of the many injuries and insults we have received from them, and on which account we have a very equitable claim to demand both justice and damages.

“ Article XVI. His Britannic majesty shall cause all the fortifications to be demolished which his subjects have erected in the bay of Honduras, and other places of the territory of Spain in that part of the world, four months after the ratification of the definitive treaty: and his catholic majesty shall not for the future suffer the subjects of his Britannic majesty, or their workmen, to be disturbed or molested under any pretence whatever, in their occupation of cutting, loading and carrying away logwood; and for this purpose they may build without hindrance,

hindrance, and occupy without interruption, the houses and magazines necessary for them, their families, and for their effects; and his said catholic majesty assures to them by this article, the entire enjoyment of what is above stipulated."

Had it been stipulated that all former treaties should have been fulfilled, this article would not have been here.

The first settlement of the log-wood colony, in the bay of Honduras, was by the English in 1656. The Indians acknowledged the sovereignty of the crown of Great Britain, and payed homage, and took the oaths to every new governor of Jamaica, on his first arrival. And we have just as good a right to this colony, as any of the British planters have to their estates in America;

America ; such acts as these being deemed, in the West Indies, to give the strongest right and title to such plantations. Moreover, the river Bellese and the land adjacent, has been claimed time immemorial by the Moskitoe Indians, who were from the first in alliance with Britain, and who were the original natives of the place, and have never been conquered by, nor submitted to the dominion of the Spaniards, (who have no towns or forts either in the bay of Honduras or the Moskitoe country) but have long been faithful friends and allies to the English nation : they have by virtue of submitting to the sovereignty of the crown of England, and this crown's acceptance of such their submission, put themselves and all their lands and territories under the dominion of the British govern-
I ment ;

ment ; and therefore, in consequence this river, and the land adjoining, claimed by the British logwood-cutters and traders, became annexed to the crown of England, from the first possession of the same. The right then of the British subjects to cut logwood, &c. in the bay of Honduras, being so evident and uncontrovertible, this 16th article, which “ causes all the fortifications which they shall have erected in this bay, to be demolished ” is of great difference, as it renders our situation entirely precarious, and wholly dependent on the Spaniards. In the bay of Campeachy we have an equal right to the cutting of logwood, and it is confirmed by treaties. In the year 1667, when the first general treaty of commerce was made between France and Spain, some English privateers happened to land

on the province of Jucatan, a peninsula of Mexico, in the bays of Honduras and Campeachy, and penetrated a great way into the country, without seeing one Spaniard there; upon which they justly concluded they had a right to take possession of it, which they did by the strongest tenure that can be imagined, viz. clearing and planting ground, felling wood and building houses. They received great encouragement from Jamaica, &c. and in the year 1669 great quantities of logwood were transported both to Jamaica and New-England. The next year, 1670, was concluded the American treaty by Sir William Godolphin, which, by the famous clause of *uti possidetis*, confirmed to the English all their possessions in America; and their logwood trade, and possessions upon the bay of Campeachy,

were thereby *clearly* confirmed. It is very remarkable, that from the time of their first settling in that bay in 1667 to the 1670, when the above treaty was made, the English did not meet with the least interruption from the Spaniards, nor do we find one single memorial made against the said treaty by the Spanish minister at the court of England. However, in 1672 the Spaniards began to question the English right to that trade; for in that same year the queen Regent of Spain published a royal Cedula, importing, “ that such as should make an invasion, or trade without licence in the ports of the Indies, should be proceeded against as pirates, &c.” This Cedula was construed by the Spaniards to inhibit the English from cutting logwood in Campeachy, and they actually confiscated

confiscated all English ships that had any on board. This, however, being an act of unjust power, and not acquiesced in by the English, their right to the settlement in Campeachy, and the lodwood trade, was not thereby weakened: the treaty of Utrecht confirmed it; because, after confirming the American treaty, a stipulation is inserted, "that the same shall be without any prejudice to any liberty or power, which the subjects of Great Britain enjoyed before, either thro' right, sufference, or indulgence."

The XVIIth article says, the king of Spain renounces his claim to the fishery of Newfoundland. This claim was never lawful, nor in any former time ever admitted by the English.

" Art. XVIII. The king of Great Britain shall restore to Spain all that
he

he has conquered in the island of Cuba, with the fortrefs of the Havana; and that fortrefs, as well as all the other fortresses of the said island, shall be restored in the same condition they were in when they were conquered by his Britannic majesty's arms."

The effects of this restitution will in all probability be felt when it is too late to retrieve them; when the ambitious desires of the family compact shall begin to be put in execution. The possession of this place in a time of war, would enable us to lock up the Spanish treasures; or if Spain should attempt to bring them home, to take and apply them to our own use and purpose. Deprived of these resources, in a short time, she would become destitute of finances, and wholly unable to support the expence of a war,

war
like
cern
fion
175
erte
pre
her
and
use
tati
fro
con
bec
bur
eve
Sp
the
fre
spr
th
m
fo

land of
the Ha-
well as
the said
the same
when they
Britannic

stitution
elt when
; when
e family
put in
of this
ould en-
ish trea-
tempt to
nd apply
purpose.
es, in a
become
holly un-
ence of a
war,

war ; not only Spain, but France likewise must feel, with equal concern the fatal effects of this possession. France became bankrupt in 1759, since which time she has exerted every art of power and oppression, by insupportable taxes upon her people, of all ranks, to the ruin and beggary of her subjects ; made use of every art and mode of solicitation to extort loans, free gifts, &c. from every degree of men in every corner of the kingdom ; she has been obliged to the Dutch, Ham- burghers and Genoese ; and who- ever would trust her, but chiefly to Spain. The annual treasures from the West Indies, flowing into Spain free and unmolested, gave fresh spring to her hopes, and combined the two nations into one by the family compact ; and from the re- sources derived from thence she has

has kept her head above water: But these resources were cut off by the loss of the Havana. France must inevitably have shared the same imbecility, and want with Spain, and be as destitute of money, as she is already of credit, had she not by her policy, just saved herself in time by this peace

The keeping the Havanna in our possession in time of peace would have been a firmer bond of friendship, and perpetual Union between England and Spain than can ever be effected by the most explicit treaties: in this case the old adage would have been as good as ever, "Peace with Spain and war with all the World." For the Havannah, in our possession, would still have been very useful to Spain, provided she returned to her old principles, and adopted us as her favourite commercial nation. By the

the
shou
the
of co
stap
and
Spa
as f
arti
pov
the
wo
be
ev
tra
in
m
ha
an
to
in
v
a

the Spaniards adhering to us, we should have reaped the benefit of the slave trade, and a copious field of consumption for our home and staple commodities of every kind, and this would have been putting Spain to no disadvantage whatever, as she must be supplied with those articles by the French, or some other power, if not by us. In return for these advantages arising to us, she would not only have enjoyed the benefit of the Havanna as full as ever, in bringing home her treasure, transacting her business, and carrying her authority over all her dominions in America, but would have received at all times the hearty and full support of all our power, to establish and maintain her rights in every part of the world, by whomsoever attacked: a friendship and alliance of the more exalted

K

importance

importance to her, as her whole fortune depends upon the sea; where we can do her, or all other nations, the greatest hurt, or the greatest service. Were these the only advantages which might arise to Great Britain from the possession of the Havanna in the time of peace, they might justly be deemed of inestimable value: but there is another, which, the more it is considered, will rise in its importance, and strike stronger and stronger conviction on the mind. Of the policy and conduct of all the Christian powers, no effort is so immediately threatening and destructive to this nation in particular, and to all Europe in general, as the close federal union, comprehended under the family compact between France and Spain. None ever was made with so fair and compleat a view of effecting

effecting that universal monarchy, so long attempted, so tenaciously pursued by the House of Bourbon, and so universally dreaded by every other prince and state. If France alone, and depending upon herself only, has been able to shake and endanger the liberties of Europe; what may we not expect in course of time, when she shall be strengthened by all the commerce and force of Spain, and supported by all the treasures of Mexico and Peru? these are advantages which she will now possess, and now she will look for the fruits of her industry and toil for upwards of sixty years. All these would in a moment have been blasted by our retention of the Havana. It is in this point that that place would have become the bulwark, and we the protectors and guardians of the liberties of Europe,

a post not only of the first honour, but of the greatest utility and advantage to ourselves. Nor would there have been any more difficulty in the preservation of it, than we have found in the possession of Gibraltar. The cases are similar.

By the 19th article we obtain Florida, in consequence of restoring the Havannah: a worthless equivalent. Florida is a wild barren desert; without trade or manufactures, or even people to consume them. We shall be at the expence of keeping a military force there, without being able to reap any profit by it. Every one who knows any thing of Florida knows this to be true, and that the Spaniards never made it, nor thought it of any service; therefore they may readily give it for such an important place as the Havannah. Besides, was it
of

of any value, the suffering the French to be in possession of New Orleans would effectually destroy it to us ; and if the few Spaniards, who are in it, had any trade to carry on, and had occasion to purchase any manufactures, would they not apply to their Roman catholic friends the French at New Orleans? The English are hateful in the eyes of the Spaniards, because of their religion.

By the XXth article we procure peace for our ally the king of Portugal, and the Spanish troops are to evacuate his dominions. The succeeding articles relate to the different periods of evacuation, and the taking possession of the several places restored, together with some articles of form.

Such are the principal conditions on which we are going to make peace ;

peace ; and such are the dangers and evil consequences, which, from the known perfidy of the French, we have reason to fear will arise from them.

Let it be remembered, that the famous *Family Compact* in these preliminaries is not mentioned, though it was the cause of our going to war with Spain ; and is universally said, or rather known, to be a treaty of firm union and concord between France and Spain ; formed by ambition to destroy the ballance of power, and *for ever* to disturb the peace of mankind.----As this compact is not mentioned, how can it be said that we have obtained the end for which we went to war ? Or while it exists, how can it be said that we are in safety ?

Now let us ask, if we were in our enemies situation, and they in ours,

ours, whether would they negotiate thus *generously*? Whether they would thus give away the fruits of their blood and treasure? If, besides Minorca, France had conquered Jamaica, Antigua, Newfoundland, Virginia, Madras, and expelled us from our settlements on the coast of Africa; and if we had nothing in our possession belonging to the French but Belleisle, whether she would not totally exclude us from the fishery in the first place, and afterwards treat with us on no other footing, than exchanging Belleisle for Minorca, and retaining all the other conquests? The French would not think that such acquisitions would in the end ruin them. And supposing Spain, instead of losing the Havannah, had mastered Gibraltar, how much *moderation* might we expect from the court of Madrid?

F I N I S.